Islamabad and the Missing Food for Thought (of Peace)

The cessation of hostilities between Iran and the US in early April definitely brought some relief and quick claims of transition to peace (at least by some influencers on Instagram). The failure of the Islamabad Talks and the vocal duel between Trump and Iran that followed soon forced influencers to change the message, the mood and backgrounds (both music and images) of reels.  As the situation between Iran and the US has entered a stalemate, with the continuation of a ceasefire without peace, an important issue needs revisiting:  why the talks in Islamabad failed to produce an agreement. It is indeed difficult not to follow the routine course employed in engagements with the affairs of what is called the “high politics” in terms of the usual suspects: institutions, political processes and strategic objectives. This larger story of how actors came together and behaved around the table, however, almost always ignores an important entity on the table—the food.

We are told that the food curated at Camp David by the Carter administration in 1978 played a vital role in easing up the tension and creating the rapport required to sustain probably the most difficult diplomatic conversation of the 20^th century, between Egypt and Israel. Through its efforts (with some assistance from China), Pakistan emerged as the mediator of the dialogue between Iran and the US. However, amid the enthusiasm surrounding that role, it forgot to focus on a more fundamental issue: which is how Pakistan carried out its responsibility as the host.

All of us were told that the divergence on positions on both sides was just impossible to bridge. But then, considering the complexities of the issues, the expectation was that it would be a process spread over at least a couple of days.  The arrogance in the tone and the unbridgeable positions displayed on both sides may have indeed pushed them away from the table too soon. At the same time, perhaps the “Table” itself was partly responsible. While China may have played a role in bringing the two sides together in Islamabad, Pakistan’s decision to rope in China as an ally to save the feast did not produce a similar result on the dining table. Pakistan clearly did not put much thought into curating the historically sacred act of “eating together”.

The chaos was clearly on display when Pakistan pushed for a partnership with China to save the feast. As one Pakistani correspondent observed: the menu had both the “Chicken korma” and “Chinese rice”. Clearly, the temptation to make mad experiments over food in the street (the same experiment which produced “paneer momos” a long time back) is now a pandemic. Only one group of people—the journalists—were excited about that act of anything can go on the menu. Either they had seasons of experience covering the experiments of MasterChef and its various incarnations across the globe or they were simply the ones hanging out a lot in the streets.

For the delegates of the dialogue, the Table simply could not hold them together. One can easily interpret the haste displayed by J.D. Vance to get back to the US as a return to familiar “home food”. Likewise, the Iranian delegates must have fancied Ghormeh Sabzi first thing upon reaching Tehran.

Pakistan, preoccupied with the Persian Gulf, failed to imagine the Gulf between the Hot Dogs and the Kebabs. It is here, I diverge from the decibels spent on the debate of whether India should have played the role of mediator or which of India or Pakistan would have mediated the talks better by making a claim that: Hyderabad (in India) would have been a better location than Islamabad.

While Pakistan as a host clearly was chaotic on the table, its people had better ideas about how the feast could have been made better. The various AI-generated images recreated not what was actual but what could have been possible. One such generation imagined Nihari as something that would have both savoured and thus saved the occasion. However, as food pundits would unanimously agree: the comfort of Nihari is best experienced in winters and it was long gone in Islamabad. Another thing that could have rescued the Table probably was the Sindhiri (the famous mango of Islamabad). Unfortunately for Islamabad, the talks happened at a moment when the season of the Nihari was long gone and the season of Sindhiri had not yet arrived.

In his tweet, the Iran expert Mark Dubowitz emphasized the importance of “negotiation venues” and included “chocolate” among the list of items while building the case for Geneva as a better location than Islamabad for negotiations. Here, I reiterate that: the talks clearly should have happened in Hyderabad.  Equipped with the most powerful (read: popular) version of Biryani, along with its all-weather appeal, Hyderabad would have outperformed any other place in the world. No doubt the threat of the heat (the spiciness) of the Nizami heritage would have been there for some of the delegates preferring to remain low. But Hyderabad could always have roped in as an ally: the sober and subtle version from the Nawabi heritage of Awadh. For those preferring to go even cooler, the perennial South Indian magic formula of the “curd rice” would have always been decorating the Table. Beyond that, the recent renaissance of the Middle East itself in Hyderabad, in the form of the pervasive presence of Mandi would have always allowed the retention of some element of the regional originality.  Further, Banganpalli, the “King of Mangoes,” would have arrived in time in the first week of April to welcome the delegates.

Also, Hyderabad would have easily slowed down the departure of delegates (not because of the traffic), but through the temptation of exploring the elaborate stalls at the airport displaying Osmania biscuits, as souvenirs, with a promise to go along well with both the coffee in Washington and the tea in Tehran.

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Muzaffar Hussain is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, at Maulana Azad National Urdu University (MANUU) Hyderabad.